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Social Costs of the Patent System 
LE COÛT SOCIAL DU SYSTÈME DE PATENTE 
Ning Lizhi1 
 
Abstract: The patent system is making progress and incorporating international practice at a 
tremendous pace in China. However, scholars have been raising doubts to the benefits of the patent 
system. They believe that the social costs borne by the developing countries for the patent system 
exceed the overall economic gains in the current international circumstances. China’s current patent 
system indicates that there is a lack of sufficient understanding of the social costs and of the 
cost-benefit analysis of the patent system, which causes many controversies. Nowadays the related 
study is still struggling to quantify the social cost, while the qualitative analysis is highly disputed. 
However, an anatomy of the social costs is necessary to take specific cost control measures for the 
purpose of establishing an economically more efficient patent system suitable under China’s 
current circumstances.  
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Résumé: Pas à pas, la construction sur le système de patente en Chine est bien développé avec les 
coûtumes internationals, relativement, les savants sont suspicieux sur l'éfficacité de ce système 
parce qu'il a déséquilibré le coût social des pays en développements avec le profit économic du 
monde entier, les pays en développements sont bien inquiets. Le système de patente chinois a un 
grand défaut dont l'analyse sur le coût-l'éfficacité n'est pas suffisante，et il provoque pas mal de 
contestation. Maintenat, l'analyse sur le coût social du système de patente n'a pas encore fait une 
conclusion précise, mais il est nécessaire de bien analyzer de divers coûts sociaux quand on forge le 
système de patente, afin qu'on puisse fonder un système qui peut bien contrôler le coût et peut bien 
adaptable à la situation du pays. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The most direct motive behind the patent system is to 
justify the lack in R&D investment, but the system is 
not perfect. It may induce corporate to over-invest and 
foster the desire to pursue monopoly via technological 
edge. It is impractical to try to achieve optimal 
input-output equilibrium of the patent system in 
uncertain areas like R&D. We must look at the social 
costs of the patent system in a more practical way. Since 
we do not have specific data related to the social costs 
analysis of the patent system, this article is based on 
empirical analysis.     
 
2.  OPERATIONAL COSTS OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM 
 
The operational costs of the patent system comprise of 
the administration costs of the patent authorities and 
patent holders, and is the price for keeping the system 
functioning.  
2.1 Costs of Granting a Patent 
It requires a sophisticated approval process to grant a 
patent. It is not necessary to mention that, from 
submitting an application to examining and approving 
the grant of a patent, the patent authorities and the 
applicant need to spend tremendous human and physical 
resources. Moreover, additional costs are inevitable 
during the course of examination of patents. One key 
criteria of patent examination is creativity, but even the 
most authoritative examination institutions finds it 
difficult to avoid disputes in this regard. The European 
Patent Office has internationally advanced search and 
examination systems. However, in Germany only, over 
half of the invalidation requests against patents granted 
by the Europe Patent Office were upheld, and the most 
common reason is lack in creativity. 2  Inappropriate 
decision to grant or deny a patent will have negative 
impact on the public welfare. A patent office has 
considerable discretion in determining the scope of a 
patent request letter and thus the protection scope of a 
patent. The uncertainty in the protection scope of a 
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patent will affect further research and development 
work and therefore hinder the technological 
development.   
 
2.2  Costs of Using the Patent System 
2.2.1  Costs of normal use 
Society has to bear some patent related costs, such as 
operating expenses of the patent authorities and the 
dispute settlement institutions. These expenses are easy 
to quantify. For example, the budgets of the patent 
offices in the United States and Germany in 1981 were 
USD110 million and DEM200 million respectively. The 
operating costs of China’s patent authorities are also 
included in government budgets. 
Some other costs are difficult to quantify, such as the 
costs due to restricted competition, whether necessary 
or unnecessary, which is a result of the lawful monopoly 
established in the proper implementation of a patent 
right. The costs can take the forms of decreased output, 
increased price, entry barriers and patent manipulation, 
etc. As a major technology importer, China has to bear 
the increased costs to import foreign advanced 
technologies due to the protection for lawful monopoly 
granted by the patent system. To a considerable extent, 
the protection and the benefits of the exclusivity 
entitlements under China’s patent system are enjoyed by 
foreign owners of advanced technologies. 
2.2.2 Costs of non-utilization or idle-utilization 
It is common practice for mega corporations to apply for 
a series of patents without utilizing them in order to 
maintain technology edge and to restrict competition. 
These technologically monopolistic corporations may 
also maintain their advantage by purchasing patents 
through “patent diplomacy,” or purchasing all assets of 
the companies that hold or will hold patents to construct 
a unbeatable patent package.3 A considerable number of 
patent packages are not utilized, but just serve 
monopolistic interests.  These “sleeping patents” are 
economically viable to the patent holders, but result in 
great losses to society. It is also a loss to society to 
disallow competitors to enter into relevant areas. The 
idle-utilization of patents delay the process of testing 
the patents in practice, which directly affect the 
consumer welfare and technology advancement. 
Mandatory permission of patent use may rectify the 
situation to some extent, but there is cost associated 
with mandatory permission; and losses before 
implementing the mandatory permission is irretrievable. 
Social costs seem to be inevitable.   
2.2.3  Costs of inappropriate use and evasion of 
law 
In practice, patent users often use the patent system to 
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evade applicable law for their own benefits, for example, 
the mutual holding of patents, or clauses in a patent 
agreement restructuring competition. If one company 
finds its technology advancement impeded by another 
company’s patent right, a common solution is to 
mutually hold each other’s patent, which may result in 
price alliance, production quota and entry barriers. A 
patent holder will try his/her best to implant restrictive 
clauses in a patent licensing agreement, which is the 
most important approach of utilizing a patent. These 
measures serve the patent holder’s benefits and may be 
lawful, but they will obstruct industrial innovation and 
the costs will be borne by society.  
 
2.3   Costs of Settling Patent Disputes 
Patent dispute settlement is time consuming and costly 
around the world,4 and China is no exception. China’s 
patent dispute settlement mechanism includes 
administrative mediation, administrative award, and 
litigation if arbitration fails, or direct litigation. 
Different approach will result in lawsuits of different 
nature. Sometimes two lawsuits will be carried out for 
one case: an administrative lawsuit to invalidate an 
administrative ruling, and a civil lawsuit to claim for 
compensation. The special administrative settlement 
process is more flexible. However, nearly all of those 
displeased with administrative mediation and rulings 
and driven by massive benefit from implementation of 
patents will inescapably turn to court, which increases 
the settlement costs immensely. Even if litigation is 
chosen from the beginning, the requirement for 
patent-related expertise, difficulty in obtaining evidence 
and large claim amount will all increase judicial costs. 
The situation in China is more austere since China does 
not have special intellectual property courts or 
experienced judges in this field. Other cost drivers 
include the comparatively young age and “primitivity” 
of China’s patent system, and the difficulty in enforcing 
judgments.  
Intimidating settlement costs make many turn to 
more economic solutions which result in more and more 
private settlement. Private settlement is beneficial to the 
parties, but the negative aftermath is always borne by 
society. The ultimate goal of patent system is to reward 
innovation by sacrificing some consumer and public 
welfare, so it is nothing but further infraction of public 
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interest if the sacrificed welfare is used by the parties to 
bargain, compromise, collude or form monopolistic 
alliance.  
 
3. POSSIBLE EXTRA-SYSTEMATIC 
COSTS OF THE OPERATION OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM 
 
3.1  Ideological Costs of Implementing the 
Patent System 
China does not have a patent system until recently. 
Only over 20 years passed since the patent system was 
established. Although the legislation develops very fast, 
the idea of intellectual property rights does not grow as 
fast in the public. After all, what can be copied within a 
short period of time are the regulations and systems that 
have been developed for hundreds of years in the 
Western countries. It takes much more time for the 
public to nurture the idea of intellectual property rights. 
When interviewed by the Xinhua News Agency in 
December 2005, TIAN Lipu, Head of the State 
Intellectual Property Office, admitted that in China “the 
idea of intellectual property rights is still weak among 
the public,” and that there is a lack of sound 
psychological acknowledgement. The currently popular 
saying of “reasonable piracy” indicates that China does 
not have the tradition of considering intellectual 
property rights the natural rights of the creators. Rather, 
the rules of intellectual property rights are considered 
rules of policies based on the utilitarian theories. 
Therefore, the ideological costs of implementing the 
patent system are much greater in China than the 
developed Western countries. Careful ideological 
guidance is needed from the government to implement 
the patent system, given the conscious and unconscious 
violations of this system by the public. It will be a 
difficult and long process, and we must recognize the 
difference.  
 
3.2  Costs of Obtaining Patent-related 
Information (i.e., the Search Costs) 
A patent application must refer to existing patents to 
establish its originality and creativity. The research and 
development work of a company must also avoid 
duplication of existing patents. Therefore, it is very 
important to obtain patent-related information. In China, 
the substance of a patent application is not examined. 
Given the rapid increase of number of the patents with 
usually low quality, a company has to spend tremendous 
time and money to confirm that its research and 
development work is not violating the patents of other 
companies. The policy of encouraging invention and 
creation in China by the standard of the number of 
patents worsens the widespread of problematic patents 
and “garbage” patents, which increases the costs of 
search for patent-related information. 
 
3.3  Product Price Paid by Consumers and 
Other Users 
The costs during the operation and usage of the 
patent system will inevitably increase the parent 
holder’s expenses, which will in turn increase the price 
for using the patent products by consumers and other 
users. Moreover, if the patent holder restricts production 
and raises price based on his/her exclusivity rights, the 
society will have to bear the increased costs. For 
example, in the pharmaceutical sector, the price of the 
anti-HIV medicine d4T produced by Bristol Myers 
Squibb (BMS) is USD4.5 per 40 mg in the United States. 
In Brazil, however, the same medicine produced by 
Pinheiro is sold for USD0.3. In India, Cipla sells d4T at 
USD0.1 per 10 mg, a price which is 98% lower than the 
BMS’ but still profitable. We can see from these 
examples that the ratio of the monopolistic profits to the 
price of patented products is substantial, especially in 
important sectors such as pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural products, etc. The high product price may 
cause a series of social problems, far exceeding the 
profits derived from these products.  
 
3.4  Costs of Importing Advanced 
Technology 
China as a developing country has made substantial 
progress in technological creation, but is still left behind 
compared with the developed countries. As a major 
technology importing country, the strengthened patent 
protection in China means higher royalties for imported 
technology or even inability to reach agreement on the 
terms concerning use of patent. If the threshold of 
protection is high (e.g., broad coverage of patents or 
extended protection period), the conditions for import 
of foreign patents would be more harsh, and the usable 
creations may be fewer in practice. For the patents the 
intent of licensing of which has been agreed on, the 
royalties would be higher. An individual enterprise is 
unable to bear the foreign exchange costs, which may 
still be borne by society.  
 
3.5  Loss of Basic Research 
Stiglitz, the winder of the Nobel Prize in Economics, 
once said that the creation system of a State composes 
of research institutes and educational systems. The State 
plays a limited role in technological creation, but 
provides funding to academic institutions from which 
numerous creations stem. Universities and research 
institutes normally focus on research and do not engage 
in production. For these institutions, if their research 
results cannot be patented, it would be difficult for them 
to profit from applied research. In China, because of the 
Ning Lizhi/Canadian Social Science Vol.2 No.3 2006 85-89 
 88
current State conditions, most research institutes can 
only obtain limited resources from the State. They can 
only obtain profits from licensing their patents to users, 
to support further research and to avoid unemployment 
of the researchers. On the surface, the actual profits 
derived from patent licensing have tempted universities 
from basic research to commercial research, the result 
of which is a net loss for society.5 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Some of the above costs are necessary for the operation 
of the patent system, while some others are inefficient 
costs caused by the patent system. The US scholars 
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner point out in 
The Economic Structure of  Intellectual Property Law 
that: “Although there are strong economic reasons the 
support property rights to inventions, there are also 
tremendous social costs.  In addition, we cannot with 
confidence answer the question whether the profits have 
indeed exceed costs based on our current knowledge.” 
The British Intellectual Property Commission points out 
clearly, in the report of The Combination of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policies issued in 
September 2002, that the effect of intellectual property 
rights protection is minimum in developing countries 
with weak technological abilities, based on evidence 
concerning trade, foreign investment and growth. In the 
foreseeable future, the profit of intellectual property 
rights protection in developing countries will not be 
higher than the costs. This point is sniffed by some 
people as alarmism or pleasing the developing countries, 
but reminds China to weigh the pros and cons, and 
consider carefully before designing the patent system. 
Industrial economists Kennis W. Clark and Roger 
Miller once said the reason that the patent system exists 
may be the lack of a property alternative. Up to now, the 
human being has not designed a better system than the 
patent system to encourage creation and invention. In 
the current context, the positive effect of implementing 
the patent system should be first acknowledged. The 
purpose of analyzing in this article the social costs of the 
patent system is not to deny the positive effect of the 
patent system, but to shed some light on the search for a 
more economical patent system. According to the 
neo-institutionalist economic theories, the economic 
activities of any entity may cause external diseconomies, 
i.e., social costs, due to unpaid costs. Taking into 
consideration social resources allocation and social 
benefits coordination, the State must participate in and 
affect positively the determination of social costs in one 
way or another, rather than rely solely on the 
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spontaneous adjustment of the market.6 Costs are not 
avoidable but controllable. Based on the factual 
situations as a developing country, China may take 
measures to reduce the social costs of the patent system 
as much as possible: first, to increase the operational 
efficiency of the patent system and control system 
management costs. China has been making efforts to 
increase the efficiency of the administrative agencies, 
from which the cost reduction for the patent system will 
also benefit. Second, the establishment of the patent 
system should be steady rather than in a rush. Only after 
the industrialization and technology development has 
developed to a certain level could a patent system 
encourage the creativity of inventions in China, rather 
than copying foreign technologies.7 Furthermore, the 
exceedingly simplistic and general legislation and 
enforcement of China’s patent law indicates the 
insufficient recognition of the potential costs of the 
patent system. The patent laws and regulations need to 
be more detailed and perfected. China should break free 
from the prejudice that the law shall be general rather 
than in detail, and establish specific implementing rules 
of the patent system. It is also a short cut to rapidly 
increase the patent law enforcement capacity to 
establish intellectual property rights departments in 
courts and to train judges specialized in intellectual 
property rights law. Last, the control of extra-patent 
system social costs needs efforts from all directions, 
especially from the State, e.g., by allocating more funds 
to basic research, controlling price for key products 
such as pharmaceuticals, promoting education and 
nurturing the idea of intellectual property rights in the 
public, etc. 
The unrestricted and exceedingly protected patents 
will become a heavy burden on society. The fact that 
China has been paying much attention in strengthening 
patent protection warrants the urgent need for the social 
cost analysis of the patent system. The patent system 
will benefit China greatly and serve the technological 
and economic development, only after the negative 
impact of the patent system is properly assessed.  
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